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Abstract. China’s policy-making remains a top-down process. Yet, non-State actors, particularly businesses that have aligned
their commercial interest with the national interest and political objectives of the Party-State, are uniquely positioned to impact
policy-making. This article uses China’s reopening of the wildlife trade following the end of SARS in 2003 to shed light on
the interplay of the Party’s policy guidelines, the policy-making authority of the administrative agencies, and the influence
of the country’s wildlife business interest. This article argues that the reversal of the wildlife trade ban was predestined since
expanding wildlife business also contributed to the government’s development objectives and served the bureaucratic interest
of the administrative authorities. In 2003, the wildlife businesses had unique lobbying power. It was a production of scale
that purportedly served the country’s conservation, public health and poverty-reduction purposes. The failure of the Chinese
scientists to reach a consensus on the risk of pandemic outbreaks from wildlife operations helped the Chinese authorities to
end the wildlife trade, a fateful decision. The outbreak of COVID-19 has led to an enhanced understanding of the connections
between wildlife exploitation and pandemic outbreaks. China has come to a crossroads to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of
its wildlife industry.
Keywords: China, wildlife policy, policy-making, Party-State, non-State actors

The COVID-19 pandemic is arguably the most
devastating global public health crisis since the 1918
flu pandemic. Despite alternative interpretations,
existing scientific evidence connected the current
pandemic to a wildlife market in Wuhan, China.1
On 1 January 2020, the Chinese government shut
down the market; on 23 January, it imposed a
nationwide wildlife trade and consumption ban
(hereafter trade ban), and elevated the ban as a
national legislative decision on 24 February. These
decisions are reminiscent of the short-lived trade
ban taken by the Chinese government in response to
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SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) that had
broken out in November 2002. The current trade
ban has failed to contain the pandemic inside the
Chinese borders. It is still ravaging much of the
world at the time of this article’s writing.
The question over whether China’s current trade
ban will be lifted worries many who have criticised
China for its failure to maintain the trade ban after
SARS. China’s reopening the trade 17 years ago was,
in retrospect, a fateful decision. There is no better time
to take a closer look at the events and forces that led to
the resumption of the wildlife trade. How could China
have reversed the trade ban when Chinese scientists
had traced the SARS pandemic to wild animals sold
and processed for food on the wildlife markets? What
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was the role of the country’s wildlife businesses in the
policy reversal?

1. Wildlife Trade and Policy Change in China
This article does not attempt to cover the entire
commercial empire of wildlife trade. It focuses on
the part of the operation – wildlife trade and farming
operations for the exotic food market – that is linked
to SARS and COVID-19. Its purpose is to examine
how the industry succeeded in helping shape the
fateful policy reversal in 2003. For this purpose, it
begins with a brief look at China’s wildlife trade and
policy-making, which will establish a roadmap for
the subsequent analysis.
1.1 Wildlife Trade
Wildlife trade covers a wide range of commercial
activities. The part of the trade that is commonly
known involves transnational and trans-continental
shipment of live animals, parts and processed
products across national borders. In China, the trade
also has a robust and large domestic component.
China’s domestic wildlife trade has been largely
sustained by its wildlife industry that consists of a
gigantic commercial breeding operation and other
derived businesses such as animal feed production,
veterinary supply production, trans-provincial
shipping, wildlife wholesale and retail sales, exotic
food catering, Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM)
drug production, fur processing and garment
production, and captive wildlife display and
entertainment. Commercial breeding of wildlife in
China has five components. Fur animal farming is
the biggest operation that produced a revenue in
2016 of 389 billion yuan (US $59 billion). The
second biggest is breeding for the exotic food
markets and for wild animal meat consumption.
This sector farms hundreds of wild animal species
and produced a revenue of 125 billion (US $19
billion) in the same year. The other three are
operations that supply the TCM producers, zoo and
pet markets, and research facilities.2 Wildlife trade
and consumption (hereafter wildlife trade) in this
article refers to the farming operation that supplies
the exotic food markets, live transport and wild
animal meat consumption. This is also the part of
the trade that was shut down in 2003 because of
SARS and has been again shut down in 2020.

1.2 Policy Change in China
Despite economic liberalisation, China has
remained a Leninist Party-State. Policy-making and
changing an existing policy are a largely closed
process dominated by the Party and the State
administrative agencies. The National People’s
Congress, China’s national legislature, has been
increasingly active. Yet, legislative agendas are
controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Central Committee.3 Three actors stand out in the
process. First, the Party Central Committee
produces policy guidelines, political objectives, and
the general direction of the country’s social and
economic development to guide law-making and
policy-making. Second, the functional agencies of
the government are key actors assisting the
legislatures in the making of laws and policies. And
third, non-State actors such as registered
non-governmental
organisations,
professional
associations, private businesses and others have
controlled participation in the policy-making
process.

1.2.1 The Party’s Policy Guidelines
China’s policy-making is a top-down process.
The Politburo of the CCP Central Committee
decides on major policy guidelines that include the
Party’s position on major issues, political objectives
to be achieved in a specific period, and the general
orientation of the country’s social, political and
economic development.4 Once the Party’s new
policy guidelines are established, corresponding
adjustments or changes may be made to existing
laws, rules, regulations and policies. New policies
were adopted, new production models introduced,
and a new system of rural governance was formed
following the adoption in 1958 by the Party Central
Committee of new policy guidelines to accelerate
and complete the socialist transformation of the
economy.5 Similarly, the shifting in 1978 of the
Party’s main task to economic modernisation led to
the policy of reform and opening up to the outside
world. In the ensuing years, collective farms were
disbanded; private production was decriminalised;
decision-making was decentralised; and the rural
market was reopened. Economic policies of the
pre-reform era were subsequently revised or
abolished.6 In general, Chinese laws and policies do
not divert from or contradict the Party’s guidelines.
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1.2.2 The Administrative Agencies
In the last four decades, institutional actors, i.e.,
administrative agencies, have become more
prominent in policy-making. This policy-making
role of the bureaucratic agencies has contributed to
the increase of their power, autonomy and
assertiveness.7 In 2013, China’s Party leadership
initiated the much anticipated legislative move to
amend, through the National People’s Congress, the
country’s Wildlife Protection Law (WPL).8
Involved extensively in the WPL revision was the
State Forestry Bureau (SFB), the national
government agency for managing wildlife. Each one
of the provisions of the revised law bore the imprint
of the SFB.9 Similarly, the country’s other
administrative agencies were deeply involved in the
making of regulations in their professional areas.10
By 2006, 75–85 percent of the legislative bills had
been drafted by the administrative agencies. These
agencies were also responsible for making
administrative regulations and rules.11
China’s Party-State is not a monolithic whole.
With the increase in power and assertiveness came
the expansion of their bureaucratic interests that are
not always in line with the national and public
interests. To protect the parochial interests derived
from their authority in project approval, fee
collection and penalty enforcement, institutional
actors are known to withhold, sift or ignore
information and even science, from their superiors
in policy-making. The result is the making of a
policy that protects bureaucratic interests at the
expense of the national interest.12 Some agencies
have done so in the name of protecting national
interests and for allegedly strengthening their
regulatory capacity.13 Bureaucratic interests taking
precedence over the public interest is no secret.14
Bureaucratic agencies with major regulatory
responsibilities can become defenders of the
businesses under their supervision.15 This can be a
result of a distorted regulatory authority. To these
agencies, economic gains can take precedence over
the general societal interest of public health, safety
and security. When their defence of business
interests in service of their own bureaucratic
interests reaches a certain degree, political risks
triggered by lack of government regulation of an
industry can threaten political stability. “If the
functional departments of the people’s government
only represent the interests of a group or
individuals, not the interest of the people, they can
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damage the interests of the people, the authority of
the government, and the image of the Communist
Party”.16

1.3 Private Businesses
Although the Party-State continues to monopolise
policy-making power, the process is slowly opening
up to the public.17 The Chinese authorities have
even taken actions to initiate mechanisms for public
participation and civic engagement with
decision-making. Private businesses are particularly
sensitive to and have a stake in policy change and
are increasingly active.18 The authorities have taken
proactive moves to co-opt the country’s private
entrepreneurs in an effort to channel their activism
constructively into the policy-making process. The
aim
was
to
render
their
participation
non-threatening to the status quo.19
The CCP’s decision in 2001 to open Party
membership to private business owners was such an
act, intended to turn their otherwise autonomous
lobbying activities into controlled participation in
policy-making.20 The authorisation for the building
of professional or industrial associations that are
placed under State supervision was another
institutional channel for private enterprises to have
their voices heard.21 The Chinese government has
also opened online consultation opportunities and
internal meetings for policy-making purposes to
citizens and businesses.
Business
lobbying
had
been
an
“under-appreciated dynamic” until the early
2000s.22 Studies found that business lobbying was
rising and making an impact.23 Businesses of scale
were particularly influential. An industry that
contributes more to the local and national economy;
that employs more labourers particularly from the
rural areas; and that helps fight poverty, weighs
more in the government’s calculation during
policy-making. To be abreast of changes in
government policies and be ready to fight for their
interests, businesses are known to maintain frequent
contacts with policy-making agencies and
legislatures at the local and national levels; and
sponsor and participate in policy-related meetings
and seminars. They support policy research by
academics and are quick to use scholarly
publications for their purposes; access the media;
engage in philanthropy; and hold catered events to
develop and maintain relations. The supposedly
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omnipresent guanxi (personal relationships with
government officials) has diminished in importance.
Local protectionism and bureaucratic interests have
so developed that local authorities and
administrative agencies can become willing
spokespersons for the business community. This is
particularly so when business interests serve the
political objective of the local governments and
especially if the existence of a particular industry
has been the reason underlying an administrative
agency’s expanded function or increased budget.24
In the following sections, we ask how the reversal
of the trade ban in 2003 was as much a result of the
country’s general policy orientation as the influence
of the wildlife industry. What were the policy
guidelines and political objectives of the Party-State
at the time of the SARS outbreak? What made
China’s wildlife industry influential as a business
actor? What incentivised the country’s functional
agency to support the lifting of the trade ban?

2. SARS, the Trade Ban and the Policy
Reversal
Breaking out in China’s Guangdong province in
November 2002, SARS was the first pandemic of
the 21st century. It took six months for Chinese
scientists to ascertain the source of the virus.25 On
23 May 2003, researchers from Hong Kong and
Shenzhen announced that the coronavirus that had
triggered SARS was found in three wild animal
species (Himalayan palm civets, Raccoon dogs and
Ferret-badgers) sold for food in Guangdong’s exotic
food markets. The identified virus was 99 percent
identical to the one that had sickened the first group
of patients. This finding was later published in a
peer-reviewed journal.26 On 24 May, China’s
Ministry of Agriculture announced that its
researchers had identified other wild animals such
as bats, monkeys and snakes from 1,700 samples of
59 species as carriers of coronavirus.27 A trade and
consumption ban was soon imposed by the
Guangdong authorities on 26 May.28 Earlier, a
national trade ban had been imposed on 29 April by
the SFB and the National Industrial and Commercial
Administration (NICA) based on the fact that the
first group of SARS patients had connections to
wildlife trade and catering businesses.29
The nation-wide trade and consumption ban
covered the entire industry. It revoked farming,
hunting, import and export, and all related business

permits; it ended animal performances, photo ops
and other intimate human-animal contact
programmes at zoos; it halted hunting, breeding,
trading and wet marketing and slaughtering of wild
animals; it locked down all wildlife farms; and also
brought all wildlife shipping activities to a halt. Law
enforcement actions were conducted nationwide.
Between 28 May and 1 June, Guangdong conducted
a “Green Sword” operation, confiscating more than
30,000 wild animals. At the same time, NICA
issued seven directives for starting nationwide law
enforcement actions by provincial market
regulators. In the following weeks, a total of 1.98
million market inspection trips were made,
uncovering 199,600 illegal sales cases.30 The SFB
also implemented a “Spring Thunder” operation to
fight wildlife crime. The campaign uncovered 9,000
cases and confiscated more than 900,000 wild
animals.31 The wildlife industry faced its biggest
crisis since the start of operations in the 1980s.32
The trade ban sent hundreds of thousands of wildlife
breeders, traders, transporters, wet market operators
and exotic food restaurant workers into a sudden
financial crisis.

3. The Reversal
In the first six months of 2003, China scrambled
to control SARS. When the pandemic broke out,
wildlife had been designated as a natural resource to
be used for economic development. The Chinese
public and scientific community had no idea that
this source of income could trigger a global public
health disaster. Even in 2003, when SARS was
ravaging the world, China did not see commercial
use of wildlife as a public health threat.
But China knew that its wildlife industry was not
controversy-free. For years, there had been criticism
of the farming conditions and animal welfare. In
1993, Jill Robinson, who later founded Animals
Asia Foundation, was the first to expose China’s
bear-farming cruelty.33 In 1998, the International
Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) surveyed urban
Chinese attitudes towards wildlife use in traditional
medicine, wildlife farming conditions, protection of
endangered species, and animal protection in
general. The survey confirmed that a majority of the
respondents in the surveyed cities disapproved of
the use of wild animals in TCM and that they found
cruelty unacceptable. In this survey, the public
health hazards of wildlife farming were not included
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in the questionnaire.34 Similarly, Li Xiaoxi, the first
Chinese activist who appealed in 1998 to the
Minister of Agriculture for an end to bear farming,
also focused on the welfare problem of the farming
practices. The public health risk of the wildlife
industry had not yet caught the attention of the
general public, the scientific community and the
Chinese authorities. At the turn of the century, the
national discourse in China centred on economic
development, poverty reduction, and job creation.
The trade ban began to crumble even before
SARS was over. On 10 June, the SFB issued the
“Notice on the Need to Implement a Strict Ban on
Illegal Hunting and Trade of Terrestrial Wild
Animals in line with the New Situation”.35 This was
obviously a corrective policy statement to water
down the trade ban on “terrestrial wild animals”
only, thus excluding aquatic and amphibian species
such as frogs and turtles. Throughout this policy
document, the words “terrestrial wild animals” were
apologetically repeated 53 times, apparently to
reassure the country’s turtle and frog farmers that
their farming operation would be re-opened.36 On
19 June, the foundation of the trade ban was shaken.
A research team from the China University of
Agriculture (CUA) announced in Beijing that they
found no SARS coronavirus among the wild
animals under study, including civet cats collected
from the markets.37 This study, which had not gone
through a peer-review process and was not
published, overturned the earlier findings by the
scientists from Hong Kong University (HKU),
Shenzhen Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) and the Ministry of Agriculture.
The CUA findings came at the right time for the
country’s wildlife businesses and for the SFB.
The trade ban’s impending demise became more
apparent towards the end of June. When the
Guangdong provincial government banned wildlife
trade on 26 May, it went further and proposed a
draft “regulation on patriotic public health work” to
the 10th provincial legislature. Article 7 of the
proposed regulation was on a complete ban of
wildlife consumption.38 However, only two months
later at the 2nd plenary session of Guangdong’s 10th
People’s Congress, Article 7 was changed to “no
consumption of wild animals that are protected by
laws, that are prone to spreading diseases, and that
are not quarantined”.39 The amended article
revealed that a complete wildlife consumption ban
had been resisted by a coalition of business and
bureaucratic interests.
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On 5 August 2003, through its “Policy Document
121”, the SFB officially lifted the trade and
consumption ban. It announced that 54 wild animal
species, including civet cats, alligators, Sika deer
and others, were allowed to be farmed, traded and
consumed.40 This result was not surprising. On 28
July, President Hu Jintao spoke on the national
effort to combat SARS. Besides commending the
medical community and Party officials at all levels,
Hu’s focus was on the need to accelerate economic
growth and recoup the economic loss suffered
during the pandemic.41 The risk of wildlife
exploitation for future pandemic outbreaks was not
mentioned partly because the Party leaders did not
want to take a stand on two sets of conflicting
findings by the Chinese scientists, i.e., comparing
the Hong Kong/Shenzhen findings with the CUA
findings. Two months later, civet cats returned
to the wildlife markets and restaurants in
Guangdong.
In the next 17 years, wildlife trade for the exotic
food markets staged a spirited comeback. By the
end of 2017, the wildlife industry had become a
gigantic business operation with an annual revenue
of 520 billion yuan (US $77 billion).42 Except for
the return of SARS in the winter of 2003, there was
no consensus among the Chinese scientists on the
connection between wildlife trade and pandemic
outbreaks. While the wildlife industry and
authorities in charge of wildlife paid little or no
attention to the danger of zoonotic disease
outbreaks, Zhong Nanshan, China’s top medical
scientist, took the opportunity of attending the
National People’s Congress in March 2010 to alert
the nation on the pandemic risks of wildlife trade.
He even revealed that coronavirus had again been
found in wild animals in Hong Kong and Wuhan.
Zhong’s warning failed to wake up the Chinese
authorities.43 It was not until the outbreak of
COVID-19 that Zhong’s warning a decade earlier
was revisited.

4. The Politics of Development and the Trade
Resumption
With the benefit of hindsight, China’s reversing of
the trade ban after SARS was not surprising.
Circumstantial
evidence
and
substantive
developments immediately before and after SARS
indicated that lifting the trade ban was inevitable. In

256

P. Li / Reopening the Trade after SARS

fact, China’s prevailing politics of economic
transition at the turn of the century pre-destined the
reversal of the trade ban.
4.1 Economic Transition
By the end of July 2003, there had been signs that
the trade ban would not last. In fact, there was no
evidence suggesting that the ban was a permanent
policy. A permanent trade ban would have run
against a major policy change initiated in 1999 by
the country’s political elites, i.e., an effort to
industrialise the country’s wildlife production on a
more sustainable path. This objective was part of the
country’s grand development strategy to phase out
loss-making State-owned enterprises, to transit the
economy out of resource-intensive production, and
to make the economy more competitive in the global
markets. It was the Party-State’s set policy to launch
the Chinese economy on a new mode of
production.44 The wildlife industry was expected to
be transformed from a resource-exploitative
production into an intensive, high-yielding,
conservation-friendly and job-creating industry.
4.2 A 30-year Plan
At the turn of the century, the Chinese
government saw wildlife production as a rural
development project with great growth potentials. In
December 1999, at a national wildlife management
conference in Beijing, the SFB introduced five
major tasks for the 10th Five Year Plan Period
(2001–2005) for the wildlife industry. These were
nature reserve construction, wildlife habitat
preservation, wetland protection, wildlife industry
development, and construction of scientific and
technological support systems for conservation
purposes.45 The conference did not happen at the
whim of the SFB officials. It was part of the national
government’s
effort
to
phase
out
the
resource-intensive production model and promote
intensification of wildlife farming. To implement
the five major tasks, in June 2001 the SFB
submitted to the State Planning Commission a
long-term plan to expand and intensify wildlife
production. Included in the plan were detailed
proposals and budget estimates for three different
phases (2001–2005; 2006–2010; and 2011–2030).46
The plan was great news for wildlife breeders,
traders and catering business owners. It even

contained proposals on the captive breeding of
protected species. Officials in the SFB believed that,
by flooding the market with captive-bred wildlife
products, illegal hunting would stop. To both the
wildlife businesses and SFB, phase one, i.e.,
2001–2005, was an important starting point for the
30-year plan. It was a time for the industry to
consolidate, intensify and prepare for an accelerated
growth in the second phase (2006–2010) and for
sustained development for the rest of the plan period
(2011–2030).
The outbreak of SARS in November 2002 was a
bolt from the blue. To the wildlife industry, the
linkage between SARS and wild animals sold for
food was bad news. The livelihood of hundreds of
thousands of wildlife farmers was suddenly up in
the air. To SFB bureaucrats, the trade ban threatened
to derail the 30-year plan that anticipated not only
the expansion of the country’s wildlife industry, but
also the Bureau’s budgetary and functional
expansion prospects.47

4.3 Rekindling the Momentum
On 25 June 2003, the CCP Central Committee
and the State Council issued a joint “Decision on
Accelerating the Development of the Forestry
Industry”. In this policy directive, wildlife breeding
was defined as a “new industry” with the potential
to become “a new area of accelerated future growth”
for the rural areas, an issue hugely important to the
Chinese authorities.48 The decision was a
reaffirmation by the highest authority of the 30-year
plan. The timing of the decision could not have been
more meaningful. With SARS running out of steam
towards the end of June, the Chinese government
was under increasing pressure from the industry to
lift the trade ban. The joint decision by the Party and
the State Council served to clear the way for the
ultimate policy reversal.
The government’s motivation to resume the trade
was also reflected in a long-awaited conference held
in Sanya, Hainan in March 2004. This long-planned
conference on the sustainable development of the
wildlife industry organised by the SFB gathered 187
people from national and local administrative
agencies, the wildlife industry, TCM producers,
traditional musical instrument makers, and
academia. The conference reaffirmed the State’s
decision to push for a “strategic shift” in wildlife
production and industry expansion by absorbing
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financial input from enterprises that relied on
wildlife products as ingredients or materials. Zhao
Xueming, SFB Deputy Director in charge of
wildlife, revealed that eight measures would be
announced to provide policy incentives to
businesses involved in captive breeding.49 The
conference indicated that transitioning wildlife
farming from traditional, scattered, resourceexploitative, and peasant backyard operations to a
modern concentrated production was a set policy
not to be thrown off course by SARS.
Six months later, the eight measures were
included in SFB’s Instructions on Promoting
Sustainable Development of the Wildlife Industry, a
policy document released in September 2004
reaffirming the government’s support for a
“strategic shift from using animal resources in the
wild to using animals that are captive bred”.50
Among the eight policy measures, the Instructions
stated that the State would provide breeders with
guidance, support and subsidies. To those who were
involved in the breeding of protected species such as
bears and tigers, the Instructions stated that the
government would consider adjusting, i.e.,
increasing the number of species on the “list of
terrestrial wild animals that have been successfully
domesticated with the help of mature captive
breeding technology”, a list that allows commercial
trade. Additionally, the Instructions committed
government assistance to breeders in their efforts to
market and sell their products.
Two other incentives were of special significance
to the wildlife industry. The Instructions announced
that the government recognised the breeders’ right
of ownership and right of disposal based on the
principle of “he who invests in the industry will own
and benefit from it”. To critics, this
acknowledgement represented a huge victory for the
farm owners who feared that their farming
operations, endorsed initially by the government,
would be arbitrarily prohibited because of a sudden
policy change. They demanded that the government
acknowledge their ownership rights and right to
compensation should a policy change happen. The
other incentive, a result of years of lobbying
activities by the wildlife breeders, allowed tax
breaks, loans and even subsidies to wildlife farms
that were also operating in, for example, the TCM
market.51
The reversal of the trade ban was indicative of the
importance the authorities attached to the wildlife
industry. In November 2002, China saw the rise of a
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new generation of political leaders under General
Secretary and President Hu Jintao. While the new
leadership was motivated to keep the momentum of
fast economic growth, they faced a tough challenge.
The reform of the State-owned enterprises launched
in 1997 had, by the end of 2002, resulted in 28.29
million workers losing their jobs.52 Issues of rural
underdevelopment, rural unemployment and peasant
poverty began to surface.53 To Hu Jintao and his
associates, the spectre of peasant revolt could not
become a realistic threat. Maintaining fast growth
was therefore the only way to absorb the laid-off
workers, alleviate rural poverty, and defuse rural
resentment. The new leaders had a strong reason not
to disrupt wildlife production that employed some
of the most disadvantaged rural labourers.

5. Business, Academic and Bureaucratic
Interests
The SARS pandemic and the trade ban posed the
first major crisis to the wildlife industry. During the
pandemic, the wildlife industry did not sit still. The
resumption of the wildlife trade after SARS was as
much a government decision as an accomplishment
by the wildlife industry that had helped create a
narrative on the benefits of wildlife production, used
charity to create and influence public opinion, and
sponsored research by the country’s top wildlife
experts. As a non-State actor, the wildlife industry
has learned to build relationships with the
administrative agencies, legislatures, the media and
academia to enhance their lobbying capacity.54
5.1 The Business Interest
Beyond its behind-the-scene lobbying activities,
the industry had long created a narrative about the
importance of the industry to conservation, to public
health, and economic development. Critics have
long questioned the claimed scale and importance of
the industry. Thanks to its active promotional
efforts, the industry has been acknowledged by the
Chinese government as a major contributor to rural
development.
5.1.1 The Narrative
Since the early 1990s, wildlife businesses had
produced an industry narrative that helped frame
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public discourse on wildlife. Representatives of the
industry claimed that commercial use of wildlife
served the national interests of conservation, public
health and poverty reduction. This narrative was
adopted by the media and has reinforced the
government’s positions on wildlife and wildliferelated production.55
The industry’s narrative has three target
audiences. The first is the international community
and Chinese critics who are concerned with the
impact of commercial operations on wildlife
conservation. In 1994, the business interest
described its farming operations as conservationfriendly, in response to international condemnation
of bear farming.56 Since then, the industry has stood
by the conservation claim. In 2004, representatives
of the bear-farming industry and their supporters in
academia and government, for example, converged
at the 19th International Congress of Zoology (ICZ)
in Beijing to confront international and domestic
critics. Liu Jide, founder and CEO of Heibao
Pharmaceutical Co., the biggest bear-farm and TCM
producer in Northeast China, told the ICZ attendees
that wildlife farming served to reduce poaching
pressures on animals in the wild. He claimed that
the amount of bile extracted from one farm bear a
year was equal to the amount collected from more
than 200 bears killed in the wild.57 Bear farming,
according to Liu, was therefore not to be criticised,
but should actually be praised for conservation.
Zhou Weisen, owner of Guilin’s Xiongsen Bear
and Tiger Mountain Village, a tiger farm built in
1993 just before China outlawed the use of tiger
bone in TCM, has been a most passionate defender
of wildlife farming. To convince international and
domestic critics, he showcased his breeding
operations to international and domestic visitors.58
In an internal discussion in 2015 in the presence of
wildlife experts, government officials and
conservation specialists, Zhou, Liu and other
breeders argued vehemently that they should have
the same property and disposal rights with regard to
tiger and bear parts as are accorded to breeders of
Sika deer, a protected species allowed for
commercial breeding and trade.59 They demanded
the right to trade tiger and bear parts, just as Sika
deer farmers have legally been doing. They stood by
their position that legal trade promoted
conservation.
The second audience is the Chinese public.
Representatives of the wildlife industry have
promoted wildlife farming as a “life-saving”

enterprise because of what they have claimed to be
the irreplaceability of wild animal parts in TCM
products. “Life-saving” is a powerful claim. It can
distort the judgment of even the most scientifically
minded Chinese when their loved ones are in
adversity, for example, or when the country is hit
with a major epidemic. The life-saving claim has
apparently been accepted by the Chinese authorities.
To fight the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chinese
government even joined the wildlife business in
promoting a TCM product containing bear bile as a
“life-saving” medicine. On 10 March 2020, the
Public Health Commission of the People’s Republic
of China recommended Tanrenqing, a bear-bile
drug, to fight COVID-19, a recommendation that
caused a strong reaction from critics inside and
outside China.60 To some critics, the Commission’s
decision could be used by the industry to call for an
end to the wildlife trade ban.61
The third audience is the Chinese government.
Although China has implemented a so-called
“socialist market economy”, the market is not yet a
fair and equal platform for private businesses. As
scholars have long pointed out, the country’s
reformist State is still the most powerful actor that
can impact the profitability and even survival of
private enterprises. To mitigate the impact from
policy and leadership changes, Chinese businesses
have been known to take proactive measures to have
their views heard.62 Businesses have therefore
attached importance to government relations to
better defend existing interests, fight for lost
interests, and seek new interests. Presenting their
commercial interests as national interests is one way
to lobby the law-makers and policy-makers.63 They
have mostly promoted their commercial operations
as creating jobs, fighting poverty, saving lives, and
an asset to rural development, the top concerns of
the Chinese government.64 In almost all SFB
statements, the wildlife farming industry is
recognised for its contribution to rural job creation
and poverty reduction.65
5.1.2 Charitable Acts
To the wildlife industry, charitable acts are the
best lobbying activity. In May 2003, the founder and
owner of Guizhentang, the biggest bear farm in
Fujian, made a high-profile trip to Beijing’s
Xiaotangshan Hospital, built for treating SARS
patients. She brought with her a bear-bile drug
reportedly worth 500,000 yuan, and donated the
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unproven drug to the government for use in treating
SARS patients. This ostensibly philanthropic act
was, admittedly, manifestly designed to advertise
bear bile as “life-saving” at a time when the country
was facing its biggest public health crisis in this
century.66 It was also a subtle effort to press for an
end to the trade ban.67 Despite a few dissenting
voices on the motives behind it, the Chinese media
and the public were largely silent on this donation.
In China, kindness or philanthropic acts are to be
praised, not questioned.
Unsurprisingly, the owner of Guizhentang
repeated her philanthropic act in April 2020. Her
bear-bile drugs were again donated to Hubei
province for use in fighting COVID-19.68 The
Chinese public this time did not remain silent.
“Guizhentang was not just promoting bear bile drug
as ‘life-saving’, it was using this donation to make a
case for re-opening the wildlife trade”, commented
Dezhi Yu, director of Beijing’s Capital Animal
Welfare Association.69 In fact, Guizhentang was not
alone in donating bear-bile drugs to fight
COVID-19. Heibao Pharmaceutical, the biggest
bear farm in Northeast China, also donated bear-bile
drugs to Hubei.70 Their donation was questioned.
Bear bile is used in TCM to treat ailments such as
eclampsia, epilepsy, sore eyes and swellings. It is
also believed to be good for detoxification,
purifying the liver, and improving eyesight.71 Both
SARS and COVID-19 were pandemics that took the
global medical community by surprise, so Chinese
TCM pharmaceutical companies and TCM
researchers could not have developed bear-bile
drugs in anticipation of them. Both Guizhentang
and Heibao were commended in media reports for
their charitable acts in 2003 and 2020. Admittedly,
Guizhentang’s donation in 2003 did achieve the
expected results of increasing Guizhentang’s name
recognition, its bear-bile drugs, and the wildlife
industry as a whole.72 The media reports helped
drive home the message that TCM products
containing wild-animal-sourced components were
life-saving. The wildlife industry was to be
protected, not banned.73
5.2 Scale and Inﬂuence
Studies on private business lobbying suggest that
lobbying effectiveness is proportional to the size of
the business concerned.74 In 2003, the wildlife
industry had some 42,000 farms that produced a
revenue of 56.9 billion yuan in 2003 (0.52 percent
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of China’s GDP of 1.1 trillion yuan).75 Importantly,
it was also part of the rural economy employing
several million peasants. This enormous industry
called for serious considerations from the
Party-State. Guangdong alone had 1,300 breeding
farms providing jobs to local farmers and migrant
workers. Inland provinces such as Hunan, Jiangxi,
Guangxi, Hainan, Hubei, Sichuan and Guizhou
attached importance to wildlife production to fight
rural poverty. The trade ban reportedly led to a loss
of 1 billion yuan in sales revenue to the breeders in
Guangdong province alone.76 The impact was also
felt by hundreds of thousands of transporters, feed
traders, veterinary supply dealers, exotic food
restaurant owners, and other businesses indirectly
connected with the industry.
In 2002, wildlife trade for the country’s exotic
food market was a booming business. In Guangzhou
alone, there were four major wildlife markets
supplying the city’s exotic food restaurants. These
markets and the catering businesses made the city
the world’s unparalleled “capital of wildlife eating”.
Xinyuan was the biggest of the four wildlife
markets, boasting a daily transaction of 1.9 million
yuan and an annual business revenue of 700–800
million yuan.77 From a score of stores in the early
1990s, Xinyuan Market had expanded to some 100
stores by the time SARS broke out, trading wild
animals of 1,000 different species. This was mainly
a wholesale market with stores and stalls that also
slaughtered small animals on site for small catering
businesses. The catering business in Guangzhou in
the years leading up to SARS was booming; it was
estimated that some 300 transport trucks loaded
with wild animals arrived before daybreak each
day.78 Hundreds of thousands of Guangdong rural
workers’ livelihoods depended on the wildlife trade.
By the time SARS broke out in China, wildlife
consumption, formerly limited to Guangdong and
Guangxi, had spread to the rest of the country as a
result of aggressive promotion by the traders and
catering businesses. Nationally, China’s exotic food
catering industry in 2002 was an eight-billion-yuan
business.79 In Shanghai in 2002, 16,000 of its
20,000 restaurants reportedly sold more than 1,000
tons of snakes, 50 tons of frogs, and 10 tons of birds
a year. In Shenzhen, the 800 local restaurants
processed some 15–20 tons of wild animals every
day. Snakes accounted for 10 tons of the daily sale.
Civet cats were one of the species found to carry the
SARS coronavirus; they were a popular dish on the
menu of restaurants in Guangzhou and Hong Kong
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which both reportedly consumed 86,000 civet cats a
year. Nationwide, 6,000 tons of snakes were
consumed (some 10 million snakes).80
Exotic foods were a tourist attraction of
Guangdong and contributed significantly to the
revenue of the local catering industry. Tourist agents
used exotic foods to attract visitors to the province.
A pangolin that was purchased from a trader for
several hundred yuan could fetch up to 10,000 yuan
when served as food in Guangdong.81 Wildlife
traders in Viet Nam were paid eight yuan only by
Chinese traders for every 500 grams of monitor
lizard. In Guangdong, the same amount of monitor
meat would go for up to 80 yuan and fetch 150 yuan
when it was served in a restaurant.82 Similarly, 500
grams of civet cat meat could go up from 30 yuan at
a breeding farm to 500 yuan after it was placed on a
dinner plate.83 Steamed pangolin meat for four
people could cost 5,000–6,000 yuan in
Guangdong.84 According to a Guangzhou catering
business owner, hotels and restaurants would lose
customers if they did not have exotic meats on their
menus. It was not a secret that restaurants serving
wild animal meats had profits two or three times
bigger than those that did not. The trade ban caused
revenues in Guangdong’s catering business to drop
in the first half of 2003. For example, Guangzhou
saw a 30 percent drop in catering business revenue
compared with the corresponding period in 2002.85
Businesses started their behind-the-scenes
lobbying in April when the trade ban was imposed
by the national government. Local forestry bureaus
had been pressured to send industry complaints and
“grievances” to the national government.86 The SFB
had also received anonymous petitions asking for
the reopening of the trade, a source of income for
millions of rural workers.87 Such anonymous
petitions often seemed to come in at just the right
moment, leading critics to speculate on possible
coordination between petition submitters and
officials in the administrative agencies.
5.3 The Academics
In mid-June, the wildlife industry had a reason to
be hopeful that the days of the trade ban were
numbered. The CUA in Beijing announced on 19
June 2003 that its research team failed to find the
SARS virus in the 732 samples of captive-bred and
wild-caught animals collected from seven regions of
the country. The study overthrew the earlier findings
released on 23 and 24 May by other Chinese

scientists.88 More importantly, the new findings
provided the wildlife business interest much needed
evidence that SARS should not be blamed on
captive-bred animals and that the breeders and
traders deserved to have their business operations
restored.
The CUA findings were questioned by a scientist
from the HKU who led the research work that
identified the SARS virus in three wild animal
species.89 The findings of the HKU and the
Shenzhen CDC were later published in Science, a
peer-reviewed journal (2003, Oct. 10 : 276–278),
and have since been cited more than 1,600 times
worldwide. The research team of the HKU was able
to re-confirm the presence of the SARS virus in wild
animals in their field trips to Guangdong made in
September, October, November and December
2003. It was the HKU researchers who notified the
national government in January 2004 of their
findings that led to resolute actions taken by the
authorities to cull all civet cats from the markets.90
The HKU team’s finding was understandably
unpopular among the wildlife traders and interests
that had a stake in the lifting of the trade ban on
civet cats and all other wild animals. What was
perhaps embarrassing to the country’s wildlife
management authority was that the HKU’s finding
challenged the wisdom of the SFB that had allowed
civet cats, among 53 other species, to be farmed,
traded and consumed.
However, the HKU’s follow-up findings were too
late. The CUA findings seem to have been accepted
in June 2003 by the wildlife industry and the SFB.
In retrospect, the CUA findings provided the SFB
with the scientific evidence it needed to support the
decision to lift the trade ban. The CUA findings
attracted immediate and much uncritical media
coverage when they were announced in Beijing by
the University’s president, a celebrity scientist.
Reports from sympathetic media claimed that the
CUA findings helped “restore the reputation of civet
cats”.91
Like other businesses, the wildlife industry
supports academic research. While the timing of the
CUA research might coincide with the Chinese
government’s decision to lift the trade ban, the
wildlife business interest making special efforts to
forge partnerships with academic institutions has
raised eyebrows. Guizhentang sponsored and built
inside its premises a “Post-doc Research Work
Station” and a “Working Station for Experts from
the National Academy of Engineering and the
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National Academy of Sciences”. Benefiting from
Guizhentang’s support is Ma Jianzhang, the
country’s “Father of Wildlife Resource Use” and
academician of the National Academy of
Engineering.92 On 3 November 2010, Professor Ma
attended the opening ceremony at Guizhentang for a
work station devoted to joint research on creating
standards for bear farming.93 Professor Ma’s joining
the “work station” inside Guizhentang attracted
much criticism. A Tsinghua University professor
asked if Professor Ma should be called a “supporter
of bear farming”.94 As the “godfather” of China’s
“utilisation” experts, Professor Ma helped create
China’s first “wildlife resources college” at
Northeast China University of Forestry in Harbin.
As the country’s top wildlife expert, Ma chaired
countless expert committees set up by the SFB to
evaluate a wide range of wildlife farming and other
wildlife utilisation projects. As a result of his
chairing two recent expert committees that approved
captive breeding of rhinos as well as the issuance of
hunting permits to foreign hunters, Ma was again
criticised for supporting wildlife exploitation at a
time when wildlife conservation remained a
challenge in the country and rhino poaching was
intensifying. The critics asked if Professor Ma was
truly an independent scientist due to the fact that
much of his research work was funded by the SFB
and he was connected with the wildlife business
interests.95 Admittedly, government funding of
research projects is common across the world.
Conducting research work with government funding
does not necessarily disqualify a scholar’s work as
biased. It is the consistency of the research work or
professional opinions that support wildlife
utilisation that raises eyebrows among the critics.
In China, there are two groups of academics who
support the use of wildlife. The first group believes
that commercial development of wildlife is the best
approach for wildlife conservation, and argues that
conservation would be pointless if wildlife were not
utilised for economic purposes.96
These
pro-utilisation scholars led by Professor Ma have
been most influential in China’s wildlife
policy-making.97 A second group of scholars can be
referred to as “culture defenders”. Represented by a
late Academician of the National Academy of
Engineering and a TCM expert, members of this
group are adamant that China’s wildlife industry has
been vilified in the West. They see foreign criticism
as an assault on the Chinese culture and the Chinese
government. In their opinion, China should stand
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firm in defending its industries based on what they
called Chinese culture and tradition. They see
foreign criticism of Chinese wildlife farms as either
a clash of civilisations or Western cultural
imperialism in the name of animal rights.98 To
them, defending wildlife trade and consumption
means defending China’s pride, traditions and
national interest.99 These two groups of scholars
have, since the early 1990s, been the most vocal
supporters of wildlife utilisation.
5.4 The Bureaucratic Interest
In August 2003, the SFB announced the decision
to lift the trade ban. As the country’s national
agency responsible for managing and supervising
terrestrial wildlife resources, the SFB “organizes
and conducts terrestrial wildlife resource surveys,
drafts and adjusts the state key protection list of
wild animal and plant species, directs the rescue and
breeding of terrestrial wild animals and plants,
restores habitats, monitors the sources of epidemics,
supervises and manages the collection, hunting,
breeding and trading of terrestrial wild animals and
plants, and supervises and manages the import and
export of wild animals and plants”.100 If the trade
and farming operations were banned, many of the
functions of the SFB would be adversely impacted.
5.4.1 Budget Increase
The SFB’s budget has seen an exponential
increase with the expansion of its regulatory
authority over the country’s wildlife businesses. In
June 2001, the SFB’s long-term plan for wildlife
protection was approved by the then State Planning
Commission. This long-term plan was laid out in a
more detailed SFB directive that was released in
September 2004. What followed was a steady
bureaucratic expansion of the nation’s wildlife
management agency, an expansion that was
necessitated to better manage the anticipated
intensification and growth of wildlife farming
operations. Indicative of this bureaucratic expansion
was a drastic SFB budget increase in the following
years. Between 2001 and 2009, the Bureau’s annual
budget increased 409 percent, from 636 million
yuan in 2000 to 3.2 billion yuan in 2009. Besides the
budget increase, the coverage of State funding was
also expanded to all existing and new areas of the
Bureau’s responsibility, including wildlife resource
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conservation and captive breeding.101 In 2019, the
total budget of the SFB reached 8.5 billion.102
5.4.2 Bureaucratic Expansion for Wildlife
Utilisation
Provincial forestry bureaus have also expanded.
By the end of 2017, 1,751 “Wild Animal and Plant
Management Stations” (WAPMS) had been created
in 33 provinces and province-level regions.103
However, the wildlife conservation responsibility of
these “stations” has been questioned due to the fact
that the provinces with the most stations were also
those with the most incidences of wildlife crime. A
recent study of 1,552 wildlife crimes found that
Hunan, Jiangxi, Shanxi and Hubei, provinces with
the most stations, had the biggest number of cases
involving the illegal hunting of endangered species,
and with Xinjiang and Heilongjiang, also accounted
for the biggest number of cases of illegal hunting in
general.104 This is not surprising. The WAPMS
were set up with two major responsibilities: to stop
illegal hunting and to manage captive breeding.
They have, however, worked harder to help the
breeders than to prosecute wildlife crimes. Some
have reportedly gone so far as to help whitewash
acts that violate laws and regulations.105
Unsurprisingly, while provinces with more
WAPMS were not more successful in curbing
wildlife crimes, they accomplished more in captive
breeding. Jiangxi, an inland province with 212
stations, had by the end of 2018 declared a wildlife
farming revenue of 10 billion yuan.106 Hubei with
105 stations had 500 wildlife breeding farms with
an annual revenue of 300 million yuan in 2016.107
Heilongjiang, with 157 stations, produced a wildlife
farming revenue of 2.5 billion yuan in 2013.108 In
Zhejiang province, the number of wildlife breeding
farms increased from 276 to more than 1,500.109
Hunan in Central China had 258 stations in 2017,
the most among the provinces. Hunan’s wildlife
farming expansion was also most breathtaking. In
1997, there were 193 breeding farms with farming
permits. In 2011, 700 breeding farms received or
were in the process of receiving permits.110
Bamboo rats and snakes were reportedly two of the
most farmed species. It was noted, however, that in
Changsha, the provincial capital, two thirds of the
10 tons of snakes sold daily were wild-caught.111
This suggests that these stations have failed to serve
as outposts of wildlife protection, although their
officials are known to defend wildlife farming when

it is criticised. One of the most vocal opponents of
the trade ban imposed in January 2020 was a
WAPMS chief in Guizhou.112
5.4.3 Regulatory Failure
There is no shortage of national and local forestry
bureau officials acting as spokespersons for the
wildlife business interest. In response to the Chinese
government’s decision to revise the Wildlife
Protection Law with the aim to restrict wildlife trade
for the exotic food market, a provincial forestry
bureau director openly questioned the necessity for
revising the law. Across the country, there are 106
associations of specialised farming.113 These
associations provide a strong voice on behalf of the
wildlife breeders. The China Association of
Wildlife Conservation, under the SFB, is
supposedly a defender of wildlife and conservation.
Its close relations with the wildlife industry have
raised eyebrows. The Association’s recent Board of
Directors included TCM pharmaceutical company
managers, a CEO of a hunting gun manufacturer,
and a CEO of one of China’s biggest entertainment
companies that uses terrestrial and marine animals
for performances. To critics, it would be asking too
much to expect the government administrative
agencies, the WAPMS, and the Association to speak
for wildlife protection.114
Prior to the appearance of COVID-19, China’s
wildlife markets were in a state of lawlessness. This
was partly caused by the fact that the country’s
market regulation authorities were often
overwhelmed with inspection work of other daily
necessities such as pork, chicken or aquatic food
products. Besides, the country’s wildlife regulatory
authorities contributed to the market lawlessness.
Local forestry bureau officials were known to
patronise catering businesses serving wild animal
meat. In 2012, protected monkeys in Jiangxi were
constantly poached and served in restaurants
designated for official catering purposes. Those who
were responsible for wildlife protection reportedly
participated in illegal hunting.115
In Guangxi, a province whose pangolins in the
wild are near extinction, local officials reportedly
served pangolin meat to visitors on official duties to
the province. In one case, a pangolin feast was held
in the office of local Guangxi officials.116 Critics
asked how the Chinese people could entrust the
country’s wildlife to forestry bureau officials. To the
critics, there is no reason to believe what happened
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in Guangxi was an isolated case of Chinese local
officials holding the State laws in contempt. A
deputy chief of a local forestry bureau in Jiangxi
admitted having consumed different kinds of wild
animals, including pangolins presented to him by
his subordinates.117
In Northeast China,
wild-caught forest frogs were served by provincial
officials at a dinner in honour of visiting officials
from Beijing.118 By consuming wild animals at
official catering events, the Guangxi and Jilin
officials were not only supporting wildlife farming,
but also endorsing activities involved in selling
illegally caught wild animals as captive-bred
individuals. In China, attempts to breed pangolins
and forest frogs have not been successful.
Clearly continuing the trade ban imposed in order
to contain SARS ran counter to both commercial
and bureaucratic interests. The wildlife industry and
the forestry administrative agencies were motivated
to end the trade ban. In one ranking of China’s
national government spending, the SFB’s annual
budget in 2010 shot up to 10th position among the
31 national government agencies.119 For the sake of
its bureaucratic interest, the SFB was incentivised to
lead efforts to end the trade ban.

6. Conclusions
China’s lifting of the trade ban in August 2003
was predestined. This policy reversal was as much a
result of the prevailing politics of China at that time
as a result of years of lobbying efforts by the
wildlife industry. A study of policy change in China,
a Leninist Party-State, must take into account the
priorities of the Party leadership at the time of
policy-making. China at the turn of the century was
at a crossroads. The Party’s set policy of elevating
the national economy from the old and
resource-exploitative model of production to a
sustainable development model offered the wildlife
industry a good opportunity to expand and intensify.
The Party’s policy guidelines also gave the national
and local forestry bureaus a golden opportunity to
seek a budgetary expansion in anticipation of greater
regulatory responsibilities. The SARS pandemic
and the trade ban were an unexpected threat to both
the industry and the administrative agencies.
While policy-making is still monopolised by the
Party-State and its administrative bureaucrats,
non-State actors have gained space to define, defend
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and seek their interests. A non-State actor that can
impact employment, growth and poverty reduction
is strategically much better positioned to have its
voice heard in policy-making. The wildlife industry
was such an actor. Launched in the 1980s as a key
player in reducing poverty, it had long built a case
for its own defence through a narrative that aligned
its commercial endeavours with the national efforts
of conservation, public health and poverty
reduction. The industry has long believed that it is
part of the Party-State and should be supported as
such.120 With this conviction, the industry has been
an active lobbying group through frequent contacts
with the policy-making agencies, the media and the
academic community supporting wildlife utilisation.
Importantly, the reversal of the trade ban in August
2003 was not entirely the result of the direct
lobbying activities of the industry. Rome was not
built in a day. The reversal of the trade ban in
August 2003 was the result of a combination of
factors that included the prevailing politics, the
Party-State’s set policy objectives for the economy,
the industry’s narrative that had been advanced prior
to SARS, and its strengthening relationships with
academics and the media.
Will China reverse the existing trade ban imposed
to contain the COVID-19 pandemic? Has China
learned a lesson despite the flowing of many
“conspiracy theories” diverting attention from the
country’s wildlife trade and wildlife markets? We
have seen different Chinese reactions to the
COVID-19 pandemic since 1 January 2020. The
trade ban, issued originally by three administrative
agencies at cabinet level, was elevated as a national
legislative decision. Chinese President Xi Jinping
made two public remarks on the need to stop
wildlife trade for the exotic food market. There
seems to be greater political determination to
continue the trade ban with the help of a revision to
the Wildlife Protection Law. A recent Chinese study
of public reactions to the country’s wildlife trade
ban shows overwhelming Chinese public support
for ending the trade and consumption.121 While in
2003, the question of whether wildlife exploitation
could breed another pandemic was not a concern,
preventing future pandemics tops the consideration
of the Chinese leadership in 2020.
Unsurprisingly, China’s wildlife business interest
and the coalition have not remained silent; they are
fighting for their interests. It can be expected that
the Chinese authorities will make some concessions,
such as allowing breeding operations for fur, TCM,
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display and laboratory use to continue while
keeping the ban on breeding for the exotic food
market. The Chinese government has made
concessions to business interests by allowing 16
wild animals to be included in a recently
promulgated “Livestock Catalogue” for commercial
use.122 Yet, the wildlife trade and consumption ban
has continued. Today, the wildlife industry accounts
for a much smaller proportion of China’s gigantic
GDP compared with that in 2003. There is,
therefore, less reason for the Chinese government to
lift the trade ban. Wildlife breeding operations for
fur, for TCM use, for display, for pet markets and
for laboratory use, however, are similar to wildlife
operations for the exotic food markets, in that they
have also featured concentrated feeding operations
in unnatural conditions. They, too, can become
breeding grounds for pandemic outbreaks. It is
important that countries with wildlife breeding
programmes and transboundary wildlife trade
rethink the cost-effectiveness of continuing the
wildlife industry.
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